Abstract One important aspect of biological explanation is detailed causal modeling of particular phenomena in limited experimental background conditions. Recognising this allows one to appreciate that a sufficient condition for a reduction in biology is a molecular model of (1) only the demonstrated causal parameters of a biological model and (2) only within a replicable experimental background. These identitieswhich are ubiquitous in biology and form the basis of ruthless reductions (Bickle, Philosophy and neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account, 2003)-are criticised as merely "local" (Sullivan, Synthese 167:511-539, 2009) or "fragmentary" (Schaffner, Synthese, 151(3):377-402, 2006). However, in an instructive case, a biological model is preserved in molecular terms, demonstrating a complex phenomenon that has been successfully reduced.
significant restrictions and restructuring. But on an account of explanation that includes experimental models (e.g. : Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1983; Mayo 1996; Woodward 2003; Weber 2005; Bechtel 2006 Bechtel , 2012 , reduction requires mapping between particular phenomena from biological and molecular theories. Such one-to-one maps connecting, for example, some classically defined gene with a chemically individuated segment of DNA were to provide the molecular mechanisms for the biologically individuated phenomenon. Problematically, such maps appear to revealmany-to-many relations between molecular and biological models (Hull 1974 ). Molecular models exhibit context dependence: molecular mechanisms (those phenomena individuated in terms of differences in their chemical kinds) have multiple distinct functional roles in different cellular contexts. Symmetrically, phenomena explained by one biological model can be instantiated in a gerrymandered group of molecular mechanisms and are thus multiply realised in the chemistry. Forming a dilemma for efforts at reduction, the attempt to avoid context dependence and multiple realisability is like trying to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, avoiding one steers us straight into the other.
Navigating the narrows
This dilemma is well rehearsed in the literature as a criticism of the attempt to identify the molecular mechanism of the electrophysiological phenomenon of late-phase long term potentiation in neurons (L-LTP) (Bickle 2003 (Bickle , 2006 (Bickle , 2010 . Beginning with a molecular model requiring a specific "gene expression and protein synthesis" pathway that seems promising as the mechanism of L-LTP (Bickle 2006, p. 419) , the same pathway ubiquitously re-appears in other cells engaged in biological functions completely unrelated to L-LTP. Its biological function (as the mechanism of L-LTP) depends on its cellular context. But the addition of the molecular detail required to avoid multiple functionality leads to the opposite problem: the molecular model that can explain L-LTP in these cases is too specific to work for all cases of L-LTP. Thus, if we start with all phenomena identifiable as L-LTP and search for common molecular mechanisms, we instead encounter multiple distinct biochemical pathways realising the same electrophysiological phenomena (Malenka and Bear 2004) . This apparently irreconcilable predicament supports the anti-reductionist consensus in the philosophy of biology.
In response, this paper argues that there is a space between context dependence and multiple realisability where numerous identities are already exposed by molecular models of experimentally well-characterised biological phenomena. Simple molecular models of biological phenomena are ubiquitous throughout the life sciences and are central to explanation in biology. They have been scrutinised philosophically, forming the core of ruthless reductions (Bickle 2003) and central in explanatory integrations, as the localisation and decomposition of biological mechanisms (e.g. Wimsatt 1976; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007) . However, few models have been comprehensive enough in what they identify to illuminate these as philosophically significant points of intertheoretic unity. Accordingly, this paper will introduce and analyse a recently elucidated molecular model of a complex biological (developmental) phenomenon: the hormonal regulation of a sensory-coupled, environmentally-regulated developmental plasticity seen in the model organism Caenorhabditis elegans, known as dauer arrest (Fielenbach and Antebi 2008) .
Such models, revealing invariant causal relationships through careful experimentation, constitute the points of genuine intertheoretic identity between chemistry and biology. Causal relationships quantified in controlled experimental conditions are central to biological explanation and, in many cases, these same phenomena are explained using molecular models. Thus the causal regularity seen in the controlled experimental conditions is explained by both biology and molecular chemistry and thereby the identical phenomenon is included in the two theoretical domains. And so it is by focusing only on the causal regularity revealed in controlled experimental conditions that a biological phenomenon gets preserved, as a detailed molecular model of the mechanisms underlying that particular biological regularity. So it can be seen that the problems of multiple functionality and multiple realisability can be avoided if a molecular model can be constructed such that it explains the relevant experimentally observed cases of the causal phenomenon.
These kinds of molecular models exist for innumerable simple experimental phenomena, but are generally seen as methodologically isolated fragments of a larger causal picture. This had led many to argue that while molecular models may explain a causal effect within an experimental construct, without additional resources-such as integration into a mechanistic explanation-they are generally insufficient to explain anything of broad theoretical significance to biology (Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2012) . This is incorrect, molecular models of causal phenomena in limited experimental conditions can themselves serve to unify biology. Well controlled experimental conditions allow for highly detailed molecular models to be formed. With more detail, more distinct molecular interactions can be quantified by one model. By modeling the interaction, rather than controlling for it as background variation, the context in which that model works is now broader: it remains valid in this wider range of background conditions and explains a wider range of biological phenomena.
This means, and this is exhibited in the case of dauer arrest, that multiple (experimentally well characterised) biological phenomena are meaningfully unified by single molecular models. This occurs most directly when multiple biological models of dauer arrest in C. elegans (e.g. a neuro-sensory and a metabolic pathway) are directly explained by a single molecular model. More generally, as a molecular model of the regulation of gene transcription by a steroidal hormone, it helps to explain a wider range of phenomena, from phenotypic plasticity as seen in related species of nematodes, to a more general framework for understanding the regulation of endocrine signalling in other phyla.
Explanation in the biological sciences
In order for something of biological significance to be preserved in a reduction, it must be something that is of substantial explanatory value to biology. Philosophical treatments of explanation are primarily nomological, where to explain is to have some phenomenon inferred from a set of initial conditions using laws. However, there is scepticism, arising critically in biology, over whether explanations derive their power from the normative force of universal laws (Smart 1963; Beatty 1995; Weber 2005) . Many philosophers have argued that causal explanations of phenomena within limited backgrounds are, in of themselves, meaningful (Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1981; Woodward 2003) . Such causal explanation does not require that the model be universally, or even broadly, applicable, only that the relationship reliably occurs in some specifiable range of circumstances. Here, explanatory power lies in the ability to specify the causally relevant differences behind variation in certain measureable quantities. To re-phrase Woodward's (2003) influential formulation, to explain is to ask a set of what happens to this something if these conditions had been made a little bit different within this stable background questions with answers specifying why this something occurred in terms of differences to these antecedent conditions. This matches up with the practices throughout the disciplines that constitute what has been termed experimental biology (Weber 2005) , such as genetics, developmental biology and neuroscience. A simple laboratory experiment explains an observed effect with a basic causal model. Such experimental models of causal phenomena are central to explanation. It is through manipulating, or intervening, to introduce a difference into the experimental conditions [a hypothesised cause, i.e.: an independent variable (IV)] and measuring change in this something [the modeled effect, i.e.: a dependent variable (DV)] that the measured biological variation is explained as the effect of the manipulations. The explanation for the differences between the two values of the DV is thereby interpreted causally: the difference in the IV between the manipulated and the control condition is explanatory by being the cause of the observed difference in the DV.
Such causal phenomena are theoretically important to biology. Most directly, they all explain some biological phenomenon with a simple model of its causal structure. But the phenomena being modeled are, first and foremost, testing some hypothesis derived from a theory. And so if the experiments are designed to occur in biologically relevant contexts, then the causal models produced are representing some phenomena that is biologically relevant. Explaining these very phenomena in terms of their molecular causes allows significant intertheoretic identities to be made, identifying a biologically salient phenomena with causes explained strictly in terms of molecular differences. These identities are the basis for philosophically significant reductions.
Molecular reductions
Though the perspectives are varied, the vast majority of philosophers reject intertheoretic unification through reductive identities. Some prominent philosophers of biology (e.g. : Oyama 1985; Dupré 1993) have argued that explanations in biology consist of many compatible but autonomous theories. This strategy clearly prevents the elimination of biology through a reduction; but pluralism does not unify science. Many pluralists have recently concluded that some unity is derived from different models overlapping at certain points. It is through the interaction of distinct theories/models at these intersections (where the same phenomenon is represented by more than one model) that multiple disciplines or fields are integrated in order to produce a sufficient explanation for some particular phenomenon (Maull 1977; Mitchell 2003; Schaffner 2006; Brigandt 2010) . Prominently, a number of researchers propose integrative models that incorporate several levels of theoretically independent description into one explanatory model of mechanisms at multiple levels (e.g.: Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel 2006 , 2012 , Craver 2007 . Only a very few argue that intertheoretic reductions are a possibility (e.g. Bickle 2003 Bickle , 2006 and these reductions are criticised as being, at best, patchy and isolated models of restricted scope and explanatory value (e.g. : Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009 ).
However, we argue against this current: significant identities are revealed by narrowing our analytic focus onto the fine-grained details of particular experimental models and away from broad theoretical explanations. It is the widely replicable, well-controlled laboratory experiments revealing regular causal phenomena in model organisms that serve as the fulcrum of reductions in biology. This is where both biology and chemistry refer to the same phenomena with casual models employing distinct theoretical resources. So a molecular reduction (as we will refer to it here) is the formation of a molecular model that experimentally explains the variation in the relevant parameters of a biological model in terms of effective molecular causes of the biological variation, but only within the same experimental background. Such molecular reductions can bring unification to biology in a way that previous philosophical approaches to reduction in biology have failed to appreciate: as molecular kinds.
It is by limiting intertheoretic identities to phenomena within the same experimental background that molecular reductions are clearly distinguished from ruthless reductions (Bickle 2003 (Bickle , 2006 : while both take the same experimental methods as the means by reduction occur, molecular reductions remain focused on the identities between the experimental models themselves. This makes the point of identity between the two theories the experimental effect, the causal phenomenon demonstrable in a reliable experiment. And so it is by remaining focused on the experimental results that molecular reductions can avoid the methodological problems ruthless reductions encounter: they unify the phenomena found in biological experiments under the scope of purely molecular generalisations.
The methodological problem for L-LTP
Bickle argues that research investigating the molecular mechanisms of L-LTP in the mammalian hippocampus exhibit the actual practice of ruthless reductionism in neuroscience. Inter-level experiments, where the IV and DV are individuated by distinct theories (i.e. molecular biology and electrophysiology), use what Bickle describes as a methodology of "intervene molecularly and track behaviourally" (2006, p. 420) to explain a biological effect in terms of the causally effective molecular variation. These inter-level experiments are designed to test explanatory links between L-LTP and certain modeled molecular mechanisms. A ruthless reduction of L-LTP is thereby an explanation of the electrophysiological phenomenon in terms of the modeled molecular mechanisms that have been tested in these experiments: a "structural change in the molecular make-up of post-synaptic dendritic spine" (Bickle 2006, p. 419) , as a result of gene transcription under the control of a specific isoform of cyclic AMP response element binding protein. This model is justified by experiments testing these intertheoretic links, but it is clearly intended to explain all the instances of the biological phenomenon, seen inside and outside the lab (Bickle 2003, p. 99) .
However, that molecular mechanisms found in the lab are explanatory of the electrophysiological phenomenon of L-LTP in the mammalian hippocampus is objected to directly on methodological grounds (Sullivan 2009 ). The methodological challenge is concise: maximising reliability (or internal validity) comes at the expense of external validity. The very effort to make an individual experimental protocol sensitive enough to reliably detect a weak effect can impair successful reference to the electrophysiological phenomena that the experiments are designed to explain. Directly, it is by controlling too much of the background variation (that is normally seen in the natural world) that the experiment can fail to be representative of the biological phenomena. Sullivan explains how experimental protocols will be the result of "differential activity of the constraints of reliability and validity-as determined by investigative aims and interests of the individual researcher or laboratory" (Sullivan 2009, p. 536) . Experimental protocols designed to detect a specific molecular effect may be highly reliable but resultantly suffer from limited external biological validity, they may not be generalisable to other biological phenomena.
In the case of the molecular model of L-LTP, in order to construct experimental protocols that can reliably detect variation in a specific molecular signal (required of the model), the researchers control and cancel out much of the biological noise. When biological variation is controlled to get a reliable protocol (e.g. in vitro), the results are not directly representative of L-LTP in intact organism or in other environmental conditions. Increasing an experiment's reliability by increasing control over variation in the background conditions makes it biologically artificial and of limited validity. Thereby, as Sullivan argues, Bickle cannot validly generalise beyond the laboratory conditions: there are no methodological grounds for concluding that the identified molecular cause of an electrophysiological effect found in the test tube will function the same way elsewhere, in the natural world or in the background conditions of the other experimental protocols that were used in constructing this molecular model of L-LTP. And this is the methodological core of the problem: the many protocols used to form the molecular model of L-LTP are so different (in what they measure -IV and DVas well as what they control for) that the results of the many individual experiments cannot be quantifiably compared and linked together into one model. The molecular explanation has methodological gaps between the individual experimental protocols used to justify it.
This exposes a general structure to the dilemma faced by contemporary reductionism: molecular models that attempt to adequately explain complex biological phenomena require experimental protocols that must sacrifice biological validity in order to reliability uncover the molecular details. This is the most significant barrier to methodologically honest reductions (Wimsatt 2006 ) of biological phenomena: they do not include all the biologically relevant instances. The only phenomena that are seemingly left to be reduced are those relations between manipulation and effect that have been reliably demonstrated in the same laboratory conditions. These are, as Schaffner argues, like the disembodied grin of the Cheshire cat, "patchy and fragmentary" (2006, p. 378) , working only within very limited conditions and in need of further integration with other results in order to provide sufficient explanations for the biological phenomena. To extend the metaphor: the body of biology disappears when an experimental protocol increases reliability in order to isolate molecular mechanisms. But finding only teeth still provides enough biological detail for a meaningful inter-theoretic reduction to proceed.
Preserving and expanding upon well-designed experiments
Diverging from previous accounts, we argue that through reference to the same precisely quantified replicable experimental phenomena disparate theories can, and do in important areas of biological research, draw significant identities. What makes these reductions philosophically distinctive is that, paradoxically, preserving causal phenomena from experiments performed in highly controlled, and thereby biologically artificial, conditions is the means by which the ends of reductions are achieved.
As is argued, it is the strictly controlled background of a population of homogenous organisms in highly standardised conditions that actually facilitates the explanatory unification of a reduction. It is this control that makes these epistemically important: both biological and molecular explanations are of the identical phenomena, namely the same causal regularities reliably observed in these conditions. This ability of two theories to formulate models of the very same experimental phenomenon constitutes the point of direct contact between the theories and the locus of intertheoretic identity. What makes these identities important is that they provide greater systematisation of the biological phenomena with a single molecular model. This completes the requirements for reduction by unifying multiple biological phenomena under the explanatory scope of a single molecular model. While this does not resemble most philosophical accounts of reduction, it does, as is being argued, achieve its aims: connecting terms from distinct theories and unifying science by demonstrating greater theoretical systematisation of the phenomena (though employing a different mechanism).
The origins of this account of reduction can be traced back to Kemeny and Oppenheim's 1956 criticisms of reductionism and shares with it a similar goal: to show that "previous definitions were too narrow in that they excluded most actual cases of reduction" (1956, p. 17) . On Kemeny and Oppenheim's definition, reduction is a replacement of one theory by another theory, but one that preserves the observational vocabulary and leads to greater theoretical systematisation of the observations. This crucially recognises that in the progress of science, preserving the older theory by connecting its laws to those of a new theory via bridge principles is unnecessary: laws systematise the observations but do not constitute the empirical checkpoints that need to be preserved. For Kemeny and Oppenheim, preservation of the observable phenomena across an advance in theory, that is, a change that increases the systematisation of the observations, is both necessary and sufficient for a reduction.
Though a fundamental distinction between theoretical and observational vocabularies is no longer acceptable, and we understand that a hypothesis cannot be falsified in isolation of all others, simple causal hypotheses tested within replicable experiments can be meaningfully dissociated from their broader theoretical motivations and serve as the observations that can be systematised with a different theoretical explanation. A sketch of an early example of such dissociation is given in an examination of M. Faraday's experiments on electromagnetism (Cobb 2009 ). Cobb argues that Faraday's replication of previous experiments on inducing magnetism with electric currents is an example of substantially theory-independent experimentation. Faraday was working in a broadly different theoretical-even metaphysical-paradigm from his contemporary Ampere, who differed on basic "assumptions concerning the underlying physical state of a conducting wire as it carries electrical current" (Cobb, p. 627 ). Yet Faraday did not fail to replicate experimental results discovered within Ampere's distinct paradigm, showing how the replicable experimental phenomenon can be viewed from both theoretical perspectives. This is obvious when one pictures contemporary students coiling wires, attaching batteries and re-creating these seminal historical experiments. The metaphysical disputes are irrelevant to the replication of the experiment and do not get in the way of seeing the same causal relationship.
This has also proven true with the cases of Pavlov and Mendel: their careful manipulations can still be systematically replicated with any dog or in any backyard peagarden. What gets retained is the biologically interesting experimental phenomenonthe causal relations between the manipulated independent and measured dependent variables. What is not retained is the theoretical explanation of the experimental results. Such historical precedents illuminate the differences between the replicable experiment and the broader theoretical models and allow visualisation of the distinction that allows us to retain good experiments and continue to replicate their results while remaining substantively independent of theories and their laws.
Basic experimental interventions designed to investigate and functionally characterise some biological phenomenon are capable of yielding quantified causal models. These biological models of causal relations can be replaced by molecular models explaining the same experimental phenomena. Replacing a biological model with a molecular one demonstrates how there is a distinction between broader theoretical commitments and the experimental results. This also shows that it is the biologically modeled causal phenomena exposed in experiments that are preserved and systematised in molecular reductions. Such basic experimentation, which explores the effects of carefully controlled variation, occurs when organisms repeatedly respond to specific stimulations, pea plant phenotypes reappear at predictable rates or when electromagnets reliably attract iron filings.
Such widely replicable experiments characterising invariant causal relationships serve as the fulcrum of molecular reductions in biology, as the observable phenomena that can be unambiguously preserved. This is not a singular token event but rather a regularity that can be examined in different ways, allowing multiple theories to study the identical phenomena. Concisely, it is the "reliability of experimental knowledge" (Mayo 1996, p. 110 ) and the theory-independent reality of experimentally demonstrated causal phenomena (Cartwright 1983 ) that allow the causal regularities found in a replicable experiment to be included in multiple theories. And this is exactly what we want preserved across distinct theoretical explanations and carried through progress in the empirical sciences: those causal phenomena that have been repeatedly demonstrated experimentally, independently of any differences to their theoretical explanations.
In doing this, molecular models reduce biology: firstly, by being comprehensive enough to identify multiple biologically important causal phenomena directly as elements of one molecular model and secondly, by aiding in the explanation of distinct biological phenomena through the discovery of the specific details of common molecular mechanisms. And, through this unification of biological phenomena via molecular generalisations, these reductions show themselves not to be that patchy in the end. We can now see how this works.
Caenorhabditis elegans: the worm
Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), was chosen as a model organism in the 1970s (Brenner 1974) and is now ubiquitous in biology labs where it is used in molecular genetics, developmental biology and recently, behavioural neuroscience. Theworm (as it is known) is, arguably, the most comprehensively understood multi-cellular organism in biological research. An easily housed organism, reproducing hermaphroditically in a three day lifecycle through four larval stages, large numbers of genetically homogenous animals (e.g.: N2 Bristol strain wild-type) are cultured in highly standardised conditions: nematode growth medium (NGM) agar petri dishes at 15-25 • C with worms fed Escherichia coli (Brenner 1974) . This makes C. elegans an ideal organism for experimental studies needing the stability of large numbers of very similar subjects in replicable experimental conditions in order to reduce error and achieve statistically significant results.
It is one particular developmental phenomenon that offers an illuminating example of molecular reductions. C. elegans, in response to changes in environmental conditions, will enter a specialised larval state called dauer arrest (Cassada and Russell 1975) . This is an alternative, non-obligatory larval stage wherein, if the environmental conditions become reproductively unfavourable for the animal, it undergoes a profound morphological, behavioural and metabolic change. The dauer phenotype differs from that of reproductive development observably and unambiguously and these changes are accompanied by the worm acquiring the ability to endure harsh environmental conditions and persist in this state, extending lifespan months beyond a normal 14-21 days. When returned to more favourable conditions, worms recover (revert to a reproductive phenotype) and continue reproductive development.
Dauer arrest is a quantifiable and measureable difference between two possible larval stages, one that significance to biological theory generally. It is a developmental bimorphism and an example of phenotypic plasticity wherein multiple phenotypes are expressed by one genotype. Arresting as a dauer larva is one of two possible developmental trajectories during the worm's early larval development, where the other leads to a phenotype of rapid maturation and reproduction. It is thereby a true polyphenism of gross anatomical and cellular morphology: arresting is not a simple retardation of normal development but a clear difference in phenotype expressed. This makes it a clear example of epigenetic control over the expression of genes, regulatory control that extends to include salient conditions of the environment.
It is prior to the first larval moult, when, dependent upon differences in external conditions during early larval development, a commitment to develop along one of these two paths begins. The regulation of arrest is a complex metabolic and neuro-sensory integration of four environmental signals during the first and second larval stages, with critical points at the first and second moults; environmental conditions after each moult begins do not alter the developmental trajectory and no cases of intermediate arrest are observed in wild-type worms (Cassada and Russell 1975; Fielenbach and Antebi 2008) .
Dauer-like larval stages are major features in the dispersal and reproductive strategies of nematodes, where having biologically appropriate responses to changing environmental conditions is how animals deal with a variable world. The induction of developmental changes in response to contingent conditions is how many species of nematodes survive the unfavourable times or disperse through the environment (Viney 2009 ). In the genus Caenorhabditis, evolutionary explanation for why there is a period of arrest include (among others) that it is as an adaptation to the cyclic nature of their food source. Important to our examination of reduction, dauer arrest is composed of two independent phenomena: the induction of arrest as a response to environmental influences and the expression of phenotypic differences between dauer and reproductive development. It is this period of induction and a causal model of the process of commitment to development as dauer that has been the focus of detailed research that is of interest to this reductive project.
Characterising induction
Donald Riddle (1977) began a series of basic exploratory experiments to characterise the induction of dauer arrest in the N2 Bristol strain as a developmental response to environmental variation. Manipulating different parameters of standard culturing plates, his lab uncovered three independent but interacting parameters that induced dauer arrest: population density, food levels andtemperature Riddle 1982, 1984a,b) . In addition to variation in environmental conditions, when environmental changes occurred had dramatic effects on induction. Induction has two critical points at each of the first two moults, when bifurcations of developmental paths take place that determine whether or not worms arrest. Prior to the first larval moult, if crowding, food and temperature remain within a range, worms irreversibly commit to reproductive development through a second L2 larval stage. However, if conditions are reproductively unfavourable based on all three parameters, worms enter a distinguishable pre-dauer (see Fig. 1 (below) for developmental bifurcation at moult L1-L2). At this stage, the worm changes observably (e.g. reduced foraging and feeding behaviour, reduced body diameter) but has not yet irreversibly committed to dauer arrest. So, if the worms are transferred to standard culturing plates in sufficient time before the second moult, the worms will moult to the regular L3 stage. Otherwise, populations of worms arrest at rates dependent on strengths of the interacting environmental signals (Golden and Riddle 1984a) .
This was the discovery of a biological regularity, the manipulation of rates of induction of dauer arrest that could be reliably elicited in the lab by precise alterations in culturing conditions. This regularity is of significance as a developmental phenomenon in as far as these experiments were intended to represent the biological process of the induction of dauer arrest in normal populations of worm in conditions of environmental stress. These experiments were intended as valid representations of what is Fig. 1 The model of dauer arrest [modified from Golden and Riddle (1984a,b) ] representing the induction of arrest. C. elegans normally develops through four larval stages (labelled L1; L2; L3; L4), with intervening moults (L1-L2/ L2-L3/ L3-L4). If conditions are stressful during L1, worms moult to a L2d form that is distinguishable from the L2 (e.g. radially constricted; reduced behaviour). If conditions are not returned to non-stressful conditions before gene transcription nearly ceases, a commitment to arrest takes place and the worm enters the dauer larval stage. At this point the induction of arrest is complete. Worms remain in this state until conditions become more favourable and a process of recovery takes place that results in a moult directly into the L4 stage going on inside and outside the laboratory conditions, validly representing the causally relevant environmental factors that induce arrest (Fig. 1) .
What emerged from this research was a empirical model showing changes in the rates of dauer arrest were causally dependent upon (are increased or decreased by) specific and differentially timed changes in environmental conditions (Golden and Riddle 1984a,b) .
The experimental manipulations: the dauer assays
That worms will vary with respect to the rates at which they arrest in response to stressful environmental signals is a variation in the organism's phenotype. This defines a specific phenotype seen in the worms, a dauer induction variant: "Animals exhibit variations in the entry into the dauer stage when exposed to conditions that induce dauer formation in control animals" (WormBase.org Phenotype Index 2011: Phenotype 0001539). This is a phenotype that represents the variation in rates of arrest as seen in normal populations in response to any of the stressful conditions. It remains a valid model of the developmental process of arrest and its induction by environmental signals. So by quantifiably manipulating culturing conditions prior to two bifurcation points (moult L1-L2 and commitment), worms could be reliably manipulated into arresting as dauer by varying specific environmental parameters.
Despite the extensive laboratory research using worms (and comprehensive reporting of results), only one additional independent manipulation to the standard culturing conditions has been reported to have any significant effect on varying the rates of induction of dauer arrest, the deprivation of dietary cholesterol from the culturing plates (C. elegans is a cholesterol auxotroph, it cannot synthesise this essential nutrient). The result is that there are only four independent environmental manipulations that have been implicated as causes of the induction of dauer, making only four distinct environmental causes that induce dauer arrest. Correspondingly, these four manipulations also represent independent variation in the organisms' phenotype and thus defines four specific dauer induction variants. These phenotypes are defined by their variation in response to each environmental parameter. The simple justification for these four phenotypes as distinct is that, different (mutant) strains of worms will respond to each of these parameters independently. Following the general assumption that differences in phenotype (within stable environments) will most often be the result of differences in genotype, any such reliably inducible difference in phenotype will reflect a relevant difference in the genetics (and not developmental noise). So even though these are only slight differences in rate of response to different environmental parameters, the difference justifies these as importantly (from the perspective of gaining knowledge about the role of the genetics) distinct phenotypes. While research on dauer induction has great significance to biological theory (discussed in the next section), it is, however (1) the causal regularities that were empirically modeled in (2) the highly controlled, replicable conditions of the experimental protocols, that forms the philosophically interesting point of intertheoretic identity. These protocols produce easily replicable conditions in which dauer arrest is reliably induced and the biological regularity of response to each of the distinct environmental conditions are (and can repeatedly be) experimentally measured. These experimental regularities form the stable fulcrum of reduction that remains unaffected by conceptual changes, or differences in disparate and seemingly incommensurate theories.
Each of the four independent manipulations (a-d) is a simple variation of the standard cultures (Brenner 1974 ) and consists of one manipulation that increases rates of arrest: these are known as dauer assays. They are also (2) the experimental background conditions in which (1) the causal regularities are found.
In the standard cultures, the absence of arrest is expected; normal N2 worms do not arrest without one of the conditions a-d falling outside a range. However, in (a) conditions of food complete deprivation reliably induce dauer arrest at rates significantly above controls in standard cultures (in worms raised in solitary conditions). It is the lack of food that directly explains the induction of arrest in this situation and is (2) a specific experimental protocol that can be repeated and where (1) this regularity can be reliably observed. However, in (b) only removing cholesterol from the standard culturing plates (which is a component of NGM) also induces arrest, albeit at low but significant frequencies, but does so in the presence of food (Gerisch et al. 2001) . These are two distinct phenomena with independent explanations for why there was a difference in observed rates of arrest. In one, the difference in food conditions (+/− E. coli) between the intervention and control conditions explains differences in rates of arrest, while in the other it is a distinct set of conditions (+/− cholesterol) that causally explains why there is a difference when contrasted with control conditions. In (c) the third treatment, only the temperature of the standard cultures was changed. Normal N2 worms will arrest at much higher rates than controls (in 15-25 • C) when exposed to 27 • C temperatures and mutants that do not arrest in conditions a or d (why they do in c will be seen clearly below) will also arrest (Ailion and Thomas 2000) . In (d), the final of the four conditions, the only difference is to the levels of exogenous daumone-a chemically well-characterised molecule that is produced by worms (Butcher et al. 2009 ). During the early characterising experiments, Riddle discovered that the additional of daumone at a given concentration would induce arrest as a function of food available in the environment but that raising concentrations above 25μl/2ml NGM at 20 • C reliably induced dauer (in N2 worms) at rates of 100 %, even in the presence of abundant food (Golden and Riddle 1984b) , showing an independent response to this manipulated environmental condition.
It is this set of repeatable replicable experimental protocols that form the basis of the tractable interaction between biological and molecular theories. The regularities seen in these dauer assays can be referred to by both the biological as well as the molecular theories, each drawing their own theoretical implications from the very same replicable phenomena. How a direct intertheoretic link is established is seen by the fact that the manipulated conditions in the biological experiment (the dauer assays) have become the controls in the molecular ones. This is the identical causal phenomenon in both molecular and biological theories that is identified in this molecular reduction.
Biologically salient causal phenomena
Differences between each of these four conditions along with the differences to their timing represent biologically salient differences in the environment that cohere with many independent biological (ecological-evolutionary-developmental) explanations of dauer arrest. Each particular experiment models one environmentally salient observation (overcrowding, starvation, cholesterol deprivation or heat stress) and explains it as an evolutionarily salient developmental response by the organism: induction of arrest as dauer that permits reproductive survival through such harsh environments. Thus, each individual condition in the experiments designed to study and quantify developmental responses to environmental manipulations also has a good evolutionary explanation citing response to ecological pressures and subsequent differential rates of survival based on a chosen developmental path (Golden and Riddle 1984a,b) . The relevance of these experiments is as evidence integrated into broader theoretical explanations within biology.
Though dauer induction was primarily studied as a developmental phenomenon its relevance extends to explanations in ecology, evolutionary biology, and, of note, neuroscience. There are two pathways that induce dauer arrest that are independent of each other in an important way, one is solely dependent upon available levels of environmental (dietary) cholesterol (b), the other pathway is exclusively a neuro-sensory transduction of the other three environmental signals (a, c, d). Manipulating the worm's cellular physiology, it was discovered that the neurons played a necessary role in the induction of dauer arrest in these conditions (Bargmann and Horvitz 1991) . This made dauer arrest a example of neural coupling with the environment, itself a key concept in the neuroscience of perception. And the observation that the absence of cholesterol would function to induce arrest independently of these sensory pathways shows that these two are, at the physiological (or anatomical) level of biological abstraction, completely distinct induction pathways requiring distinct biological explanations (the integration of these two pathways will be used to demonstrate how a reduction unifies biology).
But in addition to this difference between neuro-sensory and metabolic pathways that induce arrest, these experimental results can also be seen as a relevant case study in the analysis of research in the emerging field of eco-evo-devo and how its component disciplines' models and theories can interact to explain phenomena that are not sufficiently explained by any one discipline (e.g.: West-Eberhard 2003; Hall and Hallgrímsson 2008; Gilbert and Epel 2008) . The induction of dauer arrest is an evolutionarily adaptive developmental response to changes in the environment, and is a clear example of one such phenomenon, though the integration of the distinct theoretical explanations comes through a molecular reduction and not an integration.
Disentangling biological phenomena from biological theory
Now, even though biological theories were used in designing the experiment and modelling the hypotheses tested, replicable experiments justify our inference that the experimental phenomena exist independently of the biological explanations. In reproducing one of the experiments, e.g. culturing in high daumone levels, the expectation would be to observe high rates of arrest. Why this is expected is based on previous experiments demonstrating this regularity in these same controlled conditions. What allows such an expectation in this situation is the phenomenological generalisation which would be reliable and predictive, even if one remained wholly ignorant of the biological explanations (or if they were, perhaps, incorrect). This is what replicable experiments provide: a reasonable expectation about what would happen in the world under certain conditions, expectations that are not dependent upon broad theoretical commitments or assumptions but only on local causal regularities discovered in limited contexts.
It is the replicability of the experiment that allows distinct theories to model and explain the same regularities. Being replicable, the same causal phenomenon explained by biology, the regulation of arrest in these standard conditions, can be investigated using the tools and theoretical resources of molecular biology. Accordingly, in conditions of high daumone (where arrest is guaranteed) or on the standard plates (where dauer is exceedingly rare) finding that a molecular intervention changes the expected rates of arrest, one can conclude that this difference causally explains the differences in rates of arrest. By manipulating an experimental treatment group in these controlled conditions one contrasts the rates of response with those in the control group; but the control group is just the regularity of response that is explained biologically. So the justification for the claim that both biological and molecular theories are referring to the same phenomenon is that these molecular experiments are occurring in the identical background conditions as the biological ones and so it is the same causal regularities that are observed in two experiments. This is the point of intertheoretic connection: it is the identical phenomenon that is studied and explained in the biological experiments that is being modeled and explained with molecular interventions. As argued for extensively throughout Bickle (2003) , with such experimental methods it is the molecular manipulation that causally explains the observed variation in the biological trait. However, unlike in Bickle's model, it is only the phenomenon seen in the experimental background that is identified, not the biological or psychological phenomena seen outside the lab.
The molecular model
The past three decades of research on the induction of dauer arrest has produced "a unified model for dauer formation whereby graded signals from the environment regulate a hormone-dependent switch" (Fielenbach and Antebi 2008, p. 2157) . This switch is a physiologically widely expressed nuclear hormone receptor complex (DAF-12 NHR) that controls development by controlling gene expression. In the absence of its naturally occurring ligand, the lipophilic hormone dafachronic acid (DA), DAF-12 NHR, interacting with heterochronic genetic signalling (i.e. larval stage dependent expression of genes), binds with a co-repressor (DIN-1) to deactivate reproductive development and activate a sequence of specific dauer programs.
The regulation of DAF-12 NHR through critically timed changes to levels of DA is the regulation of arrest: DAF-12 remaining unliganded by DA is required for dauer formation (Antebi et al. 1998; Magner and Antebi 2008) . However, while the regulation of DAF-12 NHR is considered to be sufficient (in normal worms) and necessary (in all known experimental conditions) for arresting in C. elegans (Magner and Antebi 2008) , to reduce the model of dauer induction requires the molecular modeling of the environmental regulation of the nuclear hormone receptor (NHR), not just identification of the switch itself.
While the regulation of DAF-12 is the regulation of dauer arrest, the receptor itself is only regulated through DA at critical points to induce dauer at specific times. So it is insufficient to cite only DA differentially binding to DAF-12 as the mechanism of dauer arrest; it is also necessary to include the relevant regulatory mechanisms to avoid the problem of context dependence-different biological effects of the same molecular manipulation will be seen at different times. This includes both a molecular model of the regulation of DAF-12 by DA (namely the regulation of the timing of arrest based on the difference in the timing of DA bonding with DAF-12) and the regulation of DA production, its regulation by molecular signalling pathways connected to environmental inputs. This means that the model of arrest must complete the connection of DAF-12, through the regulation of DA by signalling pathways, back to variation in each of the four environmental conditions that induce arrest.
Arresting as a dauer involves changes in a complex network of signalling pathways with multiple identified steps, modulated by many different factors. However, a complex, a coherent molecular model of the causal structure of the biological model (the environmental differences-food level, cholesterol level, temperature and pheromone level-and the developmental timing differences at the two crucial points) has now been formed.
The basic model of regulation
The regulation of arrest can only be sketched in its broadest outlines to highlight those aspects of the model that are relevant to our investigation of intertheoretic reductions; a very small review for a small worm. It was found that the means by which environmental conditions had an effect on the worm's development was primarily through sensory contact with its surroundings. In the identified sensory neurons (by convention labelled) ASI and ADF, activity of a guanylyl cyclase pathway (cGMP) is regulated by competing signals from several different classes of G-protein coupled receptor molecules (GPCR) that respond differently to food signals and daumone (Bargmann and Horvitz 1991) . These GPCRs are exposed to the external environment inside sensory structures called amphids. cGMP is up-regulated in the presence of food or downregulated in the presence of daumone. In ASI and ADF neurons, increased activity of cGMP up-regulates the activity of an insulin-like pathway (IIS). In only the ASI neuron, lowered cGMP signalling also suppresses a transforming growth factor-β (TGF-β)-like pathway. Primarily in the identified AIX and AIY interneurons (though also occurring in the ADF sensory neuron), cGMP signalling decreases with increasing temperature (Ailion and Thomas 2000) . It is in these neurons that these three environmental signals are modulating independent molecular signalling pathways, the final signal (cholesterol, which is not neurally coupled with environmental signals) is integrated with the neural signalling at the next stage, the production of DA in the XXX cells.
The XXX cells are endocrine cells and the location of the DA hormone biosynthesis pathway; these cells express DAF-9, which is the final, necessary step in the synthesis of DA from cholesterol (Sharma 2009). During early larval development, the two XXX cells remain in physical contact with the neurons which allows for direct inter-cellular signalling by the TGF-β and IIS pathways. In these cells, membrane bound receptors, DAF-1/DAF-4 and DAF-2 respond to the lowered extracellular TGF-β and IIS signalling from the neurons. Lowered IIS signalling stops inhibiting DAF-16/FOXO; reduced TGF-β signalling reduces DAF-8/ DAF-14 signalling which inhibits DAF-3/DAF-5. Both DAF-16/FOXO and DAF-3/DAF-5 are inhibited themselves under conditions of high TGF-β and IIS signalling from the neurons. But when the inhibitory signal from the sensory neurons is stopped, DAF-16/FOXO and DAF-3/DAF-5 both inhibit the expression of DA synthesis genes such as daf-9.
These signals from the neurons, and ultimately from environmental conditions, converge on the modulation of DAF-9 levels in XXX cells. DAF-9 is an enzyme that completes the process of converting environmental cholesterol into DA by another, independent molecular signalling pathway. This signalling pathway invariably begins with DAF-36 (a cholesterol 7-desaturase) (Wollam et al. 2011 ) has several branching steps leading to different isoforms (Sharma 2009) but invariable ends with DAF-9. So, due to the fact that C. elegans requires cholesterol in its diet, its absence explains why the cholesterol deprivation conditions induce arrest independently of the others. So it is the modulation of DAF-9, the final stage in the production of DA, which represents the mechanisms by which integration of these molecular signalling pathways occurs.
Finally, because DA is a steroid hormone (Motola et al. 2006) it can diffuse rapidly throughout the worm's tissues where it can bind to DAF-12 NHR, and temporally coordinate the regulation of gene expression across the entire organism. The coordination involves the DAF-12 NHR interacting with the heterochronic genetic signalling of lin-4, lin-14, lin-28, lin-29 under a regulatory feedback loop controlled by a family of let-7 micro-RNAs (Hammell et al. 2009 ). This stage represents the temporal mechanisms of the critical developmental periods (bifurcations in Fig. 2 ). Without DA during the late L1 larval stage, DAF-12, interacting with genes lin-4, lin-14, will halt the gene expression required for reproductive development. With reproductive genetic programs switched off, the appropriate L2 cell division programs are not initiatedexplaining the L2d phenotypic differences-and the worms continue the development along the path to complete arrest unless levels of DA are increased before a critical time: DA is capable of reversing arrest (initiating the L3 cell division programs) via action of continued activity of the genes lin-28 and lin-29 prior to the point where metabolic activity in the worms almost completely ceases. Herein, commitment to arrest is achieved and the process of dauer induction is complete: if DA levels are raised, worms will no longer recover to activate L3 cell division programs but proceed directly to arrest and recovery as post-dauer L4.
In the case of the induction of dauer arrest, what has been achieved is to establish the identity of the molecular differences that explain the observed difference in rates of arrest discovered and reliably observed in the dauer assays. This comprehensive molecular model identifies the relevant molecular causes involved in the regulation of DAF-12 NHR in the experimental backgrounds of all the dauer assays. By including the regulatory mechanisms of DAF-12 NHR, from DA all the way back to variation in the different environmental conditions, all within a single molecular model,context dependence is avoided: the relevant molecular variation, within these experimental protocols, entails the biological phenomenon (i.e.: the different rates of arrest). By limiting the identity to arrest found in replicable laboratory conditions, the biological phenomenon is also not multiply realised: there are no assays reliably showing significant rates of worms arresting as dauer that this molecular model cannot provide an explanation for. It is the differential activity of complex regulatory networks of signalling pathways that forms the molecular identity of the biologically significant causal phenomenon: the induction of dauer arrest in the standard laboratory assays. So here we have the answer to the dilemma: within the standard experimental conditions used to study the worm, the regulation of this molecular network is the regulation of the induction of dauer arrest. We can now try to analyse this claim.
The philosophical manipulation
Molecular reductions are different from many traditional approaches to relations between theories, as they begin with an examination of the experimental phenomena. However, in this way they are much like many recent analyses of reduction and explanatory integration (Bickle 2003; Mitchell 2003; Bechtel 2006 , Weber 2005 Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009; Brigandt 2010) . But in focusing on identities in the lab, molecular reductions are clearly distinguishable from both ruthless reductions and recent models of explanatory integration. -4, lin-14, lin-28, lin-29 under a regulatory feedback loop controlled by a family of let-7 micro-RNAs will initiate different cell division programs, one for arrest and one for normal reproductive development Like ruthless reductions, molecular reductions are based on inter-level explanations of a biological phenomenon using a molecular model. Unlike ruthless reductions, molecular reductions remain focused on inter-level explanations within the experimental conditions; they do not attempt to explain all biologically demarcated instances, only those in the laboratory assays. It is this way that molecular reductions are distinguished from other recent versions. On the other hand, when non-reductive philosophers look at these same inter-level explanations, they see these experimental results as part of a strategy of functional localisation and decomposition of these functions that are a part of larger integrated mechanistic explanations (Wimsatt 1976; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel 2006) .
Though highly heterogeneous, integrative explanations involve elements from many distinct theories that form a single coherent explanans for a scientifically interesting phenomenon (Maull 1977; Mitchell 2003; Bechtel 2006 Bechtel , 2012 Schaffner 2006; Craver 2007; Brigandt 2010) . In this way, integrative explanations are composites that include several theories' or models' resources. These are combined into one single explanatory model where each element contributes to a sufficient explanation for some biological explanandum and it is only by integrating these together that a jointly sufficient explanation can be provided. While this unifies and demonstrates that there is significant intertheoretic communication between the component disciplines, these are pluralist positions that do not establish intertheoretic identities. This directly avoids reduction by proposing alternative explanation for intertheoretic interaction, one requiring multilevel explanations and not identification.
In this regard, molecular reductions are dependent upon inter-level but not multilevel explanations; they provide an exclusively molecular explanans for a biological explanandum. For example, this is clearly demonstrated by the fact that spatially localising the production of DA to the XXX cells does not constitute a physiological-level element in the explanans. The physiological differences (presence or absence of the cell) are not the explanatory elements of the molecular model; the cell is merely the locus of the causally relevant molecular differences. A physiological manipulation, ablating cells, may change the gross anatomy, but nonetheless, the physiological changes are only the means to achieve specific molecular changes (i.e. removing hormone production; farm and lab animals have their gonads removed for the same reason). Ablating a cell removes particular molecular properties from the system (which can be achieved chemically as well), and enables us to model the causal factor in terms of molecular-level differences. This is not a multi-level explanation but an explanation based on hypothesised and experimentally tested molecular differences. So ablating the XXX cells alters the molecular conditions and the relevant difference is a drastic reduction in DA levels (Ohkura et al. 2003) . It is this molecular difference that explains changes in arrest, and the worm's physiology constitutes the background conditions of the experiments.
Correspondingly, the molecular model of dauer only explains why there is a difference in rates of arrest between the experimental and control groups within these replicable conditions. Thereby, the specific explanandum is the differential rates of arrest as seen in the laboratory within the dauer assays. In this way the worm's physiological structures and developmental differences are also not part of the explanandum, which, importantly, is the induction of dauer arrest, not the expression of the phenotypic differences. Directly, all that is being identified in a molecular reduction is what is explained within the experiments: the variation in rates of induction of dauer arrest as a function of environmental differences, the measurable causal phenomenon observed in the test tube.
4.1 The circe effect: from biological enthymemes to molecular deductions It comes out that the identity between the biological and molecular models is limited to the experimental effect seen in the lab. Nonetheless, contrary to the explicit arguments of Sullivan (2009) and Schaffner (2006) , this restriction does not preclude this being a significant reduction: comprehensive molecular models can be explanatory of highly complex and biologically significant phenomena. This is primarily seen in the unification of the separate dauer induction pathways (each with their own independent evolutionary, developmental and ecological implications) converging on a common molecular mechanism (the activity of DAF-9). But this comprehensive reductive identity also unifies biology more generally; bringing more biological phenomena directly within the explanatory scope of molecular chemistry, molecular reductions unify biology by supplying molecular explanations for biologically disparate phenomena, providing greater systematisation of the biological phenomena with molecular generalisations. Thereby, on this account, the measure by which unification is gauged is molecular and the relevant question becomes: Is the molecular model (i.e. the details of the signalling pathways) representative of biological phenomena in other organisms? The answer is yes.
Highly-controlled experimental conditions (such as in the dauer assays) allow researchers to work out the details of complex interactions between different signalling pathways. This allows for the formation of comprehensive molecular explanations for complex biological phenomena. But models of the interacting molecular signalling pathway are valid in a broad range of backgrounds and directly explanatory of other biological phenomena (e.g.: the regulation of the development of teeth in a related nematode and much more broadly, explaining the regulation of hormone signalling pathways that control development and behaviour). So it is because the model of signalling pathway interaction can explain multiple biological phenomena that unification is achieved: many disparate biological phenomena are adequately explained at a single level by common molecular mechanisms. Unification is thereby at the molecular level.
Comprehensive molecular models of complex biological phenomena
The central feature of any attempted reduction is to find identities that preserve reference to the same phenomena in two theoretical languages. In the worm, the complete developmental model of the induction of dauer arrest seen in all the laboratory assays has been preserved in the details of the single molecular model, making this a comprehensive identity that unifies. It is the comprehensiveness that makes it transparent that a reductive identification of a complex, biologically salient phenomena has occurred. The unity this identity provides is seen through the incorporation of the biologically distinct mechanisms of arrest in a single model. As seen above, two independent induction pathways, parallel neuro-sensory regulatory signalling pathways (TGF-and IIS) and a metabolic coupling with the environment are included as elements of one complex regulatory mechanism for the production of DA, converging on the regulation of one common element, the activity of DAF-9.
The important characteristic of this reduction is that the interaction between the two biologically independent dauer induction pathways is explained not by a model of partial causes or mechanisms but directly in terms of their overlap in molecular constituents. This means that the interaction between the two models (of the neurosensory and metabolic response) is exclusively within the reducing language of molecular biology: the two pathways are both involved in the regulation of the final stage in the synthesis of DA from its immediate precursor molecules. DAF-9 is the enzyme that converts fatty acid precursors into DA (Sharma et al. 2009 ). The regulation of this step is how the two pathways interact: TGF-and IIS signalling stops the conversion of cholesterol into DA by lowering DAF-9 signals while absence of the cholesterol stops the enzyme from having a substrate to bind with to synthesise DA. It is the interaction between the two signalling pathways that is the explanation for the interaction of two biologically salient models. This is crucial to our recognising that this is a reductive identity and not an explanatory integration: the relevant explanatory counterfactuals are exclusively molecular.
So, what makes this identity significant to a discussion of reduction is the comprehensiveness of the exclusively molecular model. Being comprehensive allows multiple biologically significant phenomena to be unified at the molecular level: all the distinct causal phenomena found in each of the distinct dauer assays (developmental response to food level, cholesterol level, temperature anddaumone level together with the timing around two critical points) are explicitly represented in one molecular model. However, now the causal phenomena found in each of the assays are explained by a single model that that is valid in all these background conditions. It is by expanding the background in which the molecular model works, as opposed to only in each single assay, that makes the comprehensive identity illuminating of the unification molecular reductions offer: the individual causal phenomena are united as elements of a single model that works is a broader range of backgrounds. Simply, the molecular model is more robust than the biological ones. In the case of the induction of dauer arrest we may only have a grin left to study, but as is characteristic of Cheshire cats, it is very wide and reveals all its teeth.
Broader reductive unification
So, it is by distilling the causal structure of biological phenomena to their effective chemical differences that molecular bonds are allowed to form between them, unifying biology through a molecular reduction. Thus the relevance of this one detailed molecular model goes far beyond basic research in C. elegans: the details of the interactions between the signalling pathways worked out in this molecular model are directly relevant to other biological phenomena in other organisms. This exposes the broader potential for reductive unification herein: the details of molecular interactions that are worked out in a model of a single biological phenomenon (in one species in a set of highly controlled conditions) are representative of many other biological phenomena.
Detailed molecular models remain representative of the molecular interactions far outside of the confines of the background conditions found in only one, or even all, the dauer assays. This is directly because the molecular model that specifies the biochemical interactions between the pathways involved in this developmental phenomenon is not only explanatory of arrest but is intended to be representative of these biochemical interactions in a wide range of in vivo molecular backgrounds: the model that explains the induction of dauer arrest is characterising molecular interactions that underpin other biological phenomena. This is where molecular models formed in the biologically limited conditions of highly controlled experimental backgrounds display the means by which they unify biological phenomena. The worm, being a simple and stable system, forms a set of replicable background conditions in which bio-chemists study and better "understand the nature of biomolecules and the interactions among them" in terms of "molecular phenomena such as molecular recognition, the hydrophobic effect, multivalency, enzymatic catalysis, and signal transduction" (Hulme and Whitesides 2011) . Using the worm, researchers can reliably detect the specific chemical interactions over all the noise of many regulatory networks running at full steam. Methodologically, this makes the worm the test tube where precise molecular investigations can be performed against the replicable background of a complex living system. So because of the replicable and highly stable conditions in the worm, more molecular interactions can be worked out in greater detail. And because the model is of molecular interactions in a complex living system, it will be (to a greater extent that any in vitro assays) representative of molecular interactions as they occur in other living systems. Directly, the molecular model of dauer arrest was developed in a complex and representative in vivo experimental background, so the model can be extended to many other living systems, that is, to similar biochemically complex background conditions. This is clearly demonstrated when the details of interaction worked out in developing this molecular model are found to be explanatory of other biological phenomena.
Accordingly, during periods of starvation the related nematode Pristionchus pacificus grows teeth in its mouth that allows it to feed on other nematodes. Like dauer arrest, this is an environmentally triggered developmental plasticity. So when it was found that the same signalling pathways were involved, the bio-chemical details of the molecular interactions that govern the regulation of arrest found in C. elegans research become explanatory: the regulation of DAF-9 by TGF-β and IIS signalling that was discovered in C. elegans was directly applicable to this instance (Ogawa and Sommer 2009) . This shows that the molecular details found in the limited conditions of the C. elegans assays are explanatory of other biological similar phenomenon, as details about interactions between signalling pathways.
Elaborating the molecular details of how signalling pathways interact also exhibits the broader potential for linking multiple biologically unrelated phenomena: as common molecular kinds (i.e. conserved homologous or molecularly analogous signalling pathways). This is seen in the fact that DA is a steroid hormone acting directly on a NHR. Hormones binding to NHRs and directly modulating gene transcription are known to be major factors in regulating development and behaviour in all phyla. This model of the regulation of DA can be used to develop further models of endocrine signalling by exposing the molecular details common to such pathways. NHRs such as DAF-12 are ubiquitous regulators of organism development and behaviour (Berg 1989; Klug and Schwabe 1995) . NHRs are regulated by lipophilic hormones such as DA (e.g. steroids, retinoids, and thyroid hormones). A model that includes molecular details of hormone regulation (as worked out in the worm) can be used to explain the temporal synchronisation of an organisms development under the influence of multiple genetic, environmental and developmental influences (Antebi 2006) . So the detailed model provides a more general framework for explaining the temporal synchronisation of development and behaviour through hormone signals. In this way, the subtle molecular interactions discovered within the dauer assays can be directly explanatory of biological phenomena in both closely and distantly related species. And this is how the unification of biology can proceed through molecular reductions: through work done in the molecular biologist's lab. This is the trajectory of a theoretical unification demonstrated by molecular reductions. The replicable conditions in such experimental research allow the formation of highly detailed molecular models providing comprehensive representations of multi-faceted complex biological phenomena. This finally supports the claim that science can be unified by molecular reductions: by demonstrating a means by which methodological interaction connects phenomena from disparate (biological) theories with a single molecular level of explanation that remains valid in a wide range of molecular backgrounds. And thus unification is achieved by allowing exclusively molecular level bonds to form between biologically distinct phenomena.
